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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
DUVALL V. STATE: DISTRICT OFFICES OF THE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER ARE TREATED AS INDIVIDUAL LAW FIRMS 
FOR THE PURPOSES OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
ANALYSIS. 
By: Stephen Mutschall 
In an issue of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that each district office of the Public Defender should be treated 
as an individual law firm when determining whether a conflict of 
interest exists regarding the representation of separate defendants. 
Duvall v. State, 399 Md. 210, 923 A.2d 81 (2007). In cases such as 
this, where counsel timely indicates to the court the potential conflict 
of interest, the Court will presume prejudice to the client and will not 
require an actual showing of prejudice or an adverse effect upon 
representation. ld. at 210, 923 A.2d at 81. 
On August 25, 2003, Juwaughn Alexander Duvall ("Duvall") was 
arrested and charged with multiple crimes arising out of an attempted 
robbery of a drug dealer's safe containing marijuana. While 
represented by the Montgomery County Office of the Public Defender, 
Duvall's theory was that a different individual, Adam Muse ("Muse"), 
stole the drugs. At that time, Muse was represented by another 
attorney from the Montgomery County Office of the Public Defender 
in a separate matter. 
On January 15, 2004, Duvall's attorney filed a timely motion for a 
continuance with the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for the 
purpose of securing a panel attorney to represent Duvall. Defense 
counsel explained at the motions hearing that a conflict of interest 
existed because the Office of the Public Defender represented the 
individual who Duvall maintained had committed the crime. The 
circuit court denied the motion, and after a jury trial, Duvall was 
convicted and sentenced to a ten-year concurrent prison term for each 
of his four convictions. Duvall filed a timely appeal to the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland, and that court affirmed the judgment of 
the circuit court in an umeported opinion. Duvall filed a petition for 
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writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals of Maryland, which was 
granted. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a conflict of interest 
existed although Duvall and Muse were not co-defendants and that the 
motion for continuance should have been granted. Id. at 236-37, 923 
A.2d at 97. The Court sided with Duvall and reversed the judgment of 
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, remanding the case to the 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County for a new trial. Id. at 241, 923 
A.2d at 100. 
In an issue of first impression, the Court determined that a district 
office of the Public Defender should be considered a private law firm 
for purposes of conflict of interest analysis. Id. at 232, 923 A.2d at 95. 
In reaching this decision and adopting a per se rule, the Court 
followed the lead of several other jurisdictions, the Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, and Graves v. State, 94 Md. 
App. 649, 619 A.2d 123 (1993), which indicated that a district office 
of the Public Defender was analogous to a private law firm. Duvall, 
399 Md. at 230-32, 923 A.2d at 93-95. This created a presumption of 
prejudice, forcing an administrative judge to grant a continuance so 
the Public Defender would have time to panel the case to another 
lawyer. Id. at 236,923 A.2d at 97. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 
21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantee to any criminal 
defendant the right to have the assistance of counsel. Duvall, 399 Md. 
at 220-21, 923 A.2d at 88 (citing Lettley v. State, 358 Md. 26, 33, 746 
A.2d 392, 396 (2000)). The Court of Appeals of Maryland has 
interpreted the right to counsel to include the right to have counsel's 
representation free from conflicts of interest. Duvall, 399 Md. at 221, 
923 A.2d at 88 (citing Austin v. State, 327 Md. 375, 381, 609 A.2d 
728, 730-31 (1992)). 
In discussing whether Duvall was entitled to have his conviction 
overturned, the Court identified the seminal conflict of interest cases. 
Duvall, 399 Md. at 223-27,923 A.2d at 89-92. First, the United States 
Supreme Court decided in Glasser v. United States that courts need 
not determine the amount of prejudice to the defendant. Duvall, 399 
Md. at 223, 923 A.2d at 89 (citing Glasser, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 
(1942)). In Holloway v. Arkansas, although counsel alerted the court 
to a potential conflict of interest, prejudice was presumed and the trial 
court erred by not providing separate counselor inquiring as to 
whether the risk was too remote to warrant separate counsel. Duvall, 
399 Md. at 223-24, 923 A.2d at 89-90 (citing Holloway, 435 U.S. 475 
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(1978)). Secondly, the Cuyler standard applies when a defendant fails 
to advise the trial court of the possibility of a conflict of interest. 
Duvall, 399 Md. at 225, 923 A.2d at 90 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 
U.S. 335 (1980)). Therefore, a defendant who fails to raise the 
pertinent issue must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest 
adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Duvall, 399 Md. at 226, 
923 A.2d at 91. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland applied the Glasser/Holloway 
line of reasoning given that Duvall's attorney notified the 
administrative judge sufficiently in advance of trial that she faced a 
conflict of interest. Id. at 232-33, 923 A.2d at 95. Duvall's attorney 
explained, orally and in writing, that she had conflicting duties to 
Duvall and Muse which prevented her from interviewing Muse or 
speaking to his attorney about the case prior to Duvall's trial. Id. at 
233, 923 A.2d at 95. Relying on precedent established in Lettley, the 
Court noted that counsel's representations about specific conflicts of 
interest should be given credit and assumed truthful. Duvall, 399 Md. 
at 234,923 A.2d at 95 (citing Lettley, 358 Md. at 48, 746 A.2d at 404). 
If counsel's credibility was in doubt, and the record sub judice 
indicated that it was not, the administrative judge could have 
conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine if a conflict existed. 
Duvall, 399 Md. at 234, 923 A.2d at 95-96. 
Applying the Glasser/Holloway reasoning to the case at bar, the 
Court held that the administrative judge erred, as a matter of law, in 
not granting counsel's request for a continuance. Duvall, 399 Md. at 
233,923 A.2d at 95. The Court then followed the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland's holding in Lettley, which indicated that when the trial 
court is notified of a potential conflict of interest and fails to take 
adequate steps to investigate the potential for conflict, reversal is 
automatic without a showing of prejUdice or adverse effect upon 
representation. Duvall, 399 Md. at 234, 923 A.2d at 96. 
The Court rejected the State's contention that no conflict existed 
because Duvall and Muse were not co-defendants. Id. at 236-37, 923 
A.2d at 97. The Court explained that it has never held that conflicts 
exist only in cases involving co-defendants. Id. at 237, 923 A.2d at 97 
(citing Leuley, 358 Md. at 29, 746 A.2d at 394). The Court also 
rejected the State's argument that a conflict of interest did not exist 
because other evidence at trial indicated that Muse was nowhere near 
the crime scene. Duvall, 399 Md. at 237, 923 A.2d at 98. The Court 
held that the conflict existed prior to the start of trial and prevented 
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Duvall's attorney from investigating whether Muse had a role in the 
crimes. Id. at 237,923 A.2d at 98. 
By treating district offices of the Public Defender as individual law 
firms for conflict of interest purposes, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland has clarified an unresolved issue and strengthened a 
criminal defendant's right to effective counsel as guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights. The right to effective assistance of counsel is so fundamental 
and absolute that to allow courts to try to calculate how much actual 
prejudice occurred would be inconsistent and unfair to defendants. 
The decision in Duvall will encourage courts to accept an attorney's 
claim of a conflict of interest and will lead to fewer instances of 
convictions being overturned due to such conflicts. Since many 
criminal defendants in Maryland are represented by the attorneys at 
the Office of the Public Defender, this ruling will guarantee that their 
rights are safeguarded against possible conflicts of interest, and that 
defendants will not have to sacrifice some of their Constitutional rights 
because they could not afford a private attorney. 
